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Abstract—The emerging traffic demand has triggered an im-
pressive deployment of network infrastructure, including macro
Base Stations (BSs) and Small Cells (SCs), leading to increased
energy consumption and expenditures. However, the network
underutilization during low traffic periods (e.g., night zone)
enables the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to save energy
by having their traffic served by third-party SCs, thus being able
to switch off their BSs. In this paper, we propose a novel market
approach to foster the opportunistic utilization of unexploited SCs
capacity, where the MNOs lease the resources of third-party SCs
and deactivate their BSs. Motivated by the conflicting interests
of the MNOs and the restricted capacity of the SCs that is not
adequate to carry the whole traffic in multi-operator scenarios,
we introduce a combinatorial auction framework, which includes:
i) a bidding strategy, ii) a resource allocation scheme, and iii) a
pricing rule. We propose a multiobjective framework to provide
an energy efficient solution for the resource allocation problem
and we provide extensive analytical and experimental results to
estimate the potential energy savings.
Keywords—Auction, Game theory, Offloading, Heterogeneous
networks, Switching off, Base station cooperation, Energy efficiency
I. INTRODUCTION
In current networks, data demand is facing an explosive
increase and is expected to grow at a Compound Annual
Growth Rate (CAGR) of 57% from 2014 to 2019 [1]. To
meet these demands, the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)
deploy a large number of Base Stations (BSs), while they may
also lease bandwidth from third-parties that deploy Small Cell
(SC) networks in areas with high peak traffic [2]. However, the
dense Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets) imply higher energy
consumption and, especially during night, this energy is spent
inefficiently, since the traffic is low and both the BSs and the
SCs are underutilized. To that end, the research community
has recently shifted towards the investigation of BS switching
off schemes [3]-[5], examining either single-operator HetNets,
or multi-operator networks with macro BSs only.
Works that combine HetNets and multiple operators focus
on traffic offloading from BSs to SCs during peak utilization
[6]-[8] without considering any switching off strategy. How-
ever, the SCs are used during the day for traffic offloading, but
they are most likely to remain underutilized during night. Even
when their traffic is low, the BSs consume considerable energy,
compared to the low-powered SCs. Hence, to achieve drastic
energy savings, the opportunistic exploitation of the unused
SCs and the deactivation of the redundant BSs during low
traffic conditions is a very promising solution. A switching off
solution through offloading is investigated in [9]. The authors
propose an auction-based resource allocation scheme, where
the operators submit a bidding value for the capacity resources.
Nonetheless, a particular network configuration is considered,
where it is assumed that the SC capacity is sufficient to serve
the whole network traffic, allowing the switching off of all the
BS infrastructure. In real life scenarios, however, the SCs are
not always able to fully support the network traffic, especially
when numerous MNOs are present in the same area [10].
In this paper, we propose a switching off mechanism via
offloading, where the MNOs lease the SC capacity and switch
off their BSs. Under low traffic conditions, each MNO is
willing to offload its whole traffic to switch off its BS and
maximize its energy efficiency. Since the SCs capacity is
limited, our proposal considers the diverse predilections of
each MNO. In contrast, the third-party wants to maximize its
income by leasing its capacity to the MNOs, a goal that may
contradict the MNOs’ tendency to save energy. Thus, auction
theory is employed and the contributions are given below:
1) We propose an auction scheme that enables the
efficient usage of SCs resources under low traffic.
The mechanism is designed to provide the optimal
solution that maximizes the third-party’s income and
minimizes the energy consumption at the same time.
2) We design a Markov-based analytical model that
theoretically estimates the throughput and the energy
efficiency for the individual MNOs and the network.
3) We validate the theoretical analysis and assess the
effectiveness of the proposed auction-based switching
off scheme. The results indicate the potential total
energy efficiency gains in the network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model is described in Section II. In Section III, we
introduce the auction-based optimization approach, used for
the BSs switching off decision. The analytical models for
throughput and energy efficiency are given in Section IV. The
validation of the models along with the simulation results are
provided in Section V and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our system model, consists of an area served by N
collocated macro BSs and M SCs [11]. We assume that
the N BSs are owned by N different MNOs, who provide
coverage through their BSs, denoted by BSn, with n ∈ N =
{1, . . . , N} characterizing the MNO. The M third-party SCs
(SCm, m ∈ M = {1, . . . ,M}) are uniformly distributed
within the macro cell, assuming that the number of SCs is
adequate to cover the service area of a BS [2].
2For the traffic, we assume the traffic given in [12]. We focus
on the night, when the aggregated traffic per BS is relatively
low (i.e., less than 25 Mbps, which corresponds to 22% of the
cell’s capacity, CRBS . For the sake of generality, we assume
that the traffic volumes of different MNOs may be different,
following the same pattern.
III. AUCTION FOR BSS SWITCHING OFF
In this section, we give an overview of the proposed
framework. We present the combinatorial auction to select
the MNOs that can offload all their traffic to the SCs, thus
being able to switch off their BSs. We provide the bidding
strategy and we formulate the Integer Linear Programming
(ILP) model which provides the optimal allocation and the
switching off strategy. To ensure truthful bidding, the Vickrey-
Clarke-Grooves (VCG) mechanism [13] is employed.
A. The Big Picture
By considering the limited capacity of the SCs and the
MNOs’ motivation to switch off their BSs, we use an auction-
based mechanism to motivate the operators to offload the traffic
to the third-party network. The MNOs act as the buyers, who
are willing to lease the SCs resources and offload their traffic.
The third-party, acting as the seller, collects the bids and,
through an auction, selects the subset of MNOs that can offload
their traffic. The auction consists of three main steps: bidding,
allocation and pricing. In the bidding phase, the MNOs place
their bids. In the allocation step, the third-party decides which
bidders are the winners and, in the pricing step, each winner’s
payment price is settled. The winning MNOs offload their
traffic to the SCs and switch off their BSs, while the losing
bidders keep their BSs active.
B. Bidding Strategy
Each SCm of the third-party (seller) is willing to lease its
capacity resources CRSC to the MNOs. Moreover, each MNO
n ∈ N wants to lease specific resources CRn,m from SCm to
offload their traffic. The MNOs valuate the capacity resources
at a given price un,m, unknown to the third-party and the other
bidders. According to the auction theory, each operator submits
the bid pair Bn,m = (bn,m, CRn,m), representing the price,
bn,m ≤ un,m, that the MNO n is willing to pay for leasing
the capacity CRn,m from SCm.
C. Auction Formulation
By employing the properties of combinatorial auction the-
ory, we formulate the problem of the opportunistic offloading
as an auction. Each MNO n ∈ N places the corresponding bid
pair, Bn,m. Having received the bids, the third-party selects the
subset of MNOs that maximizes the desired goals.
Let us define the binary variable xn,m as a binary deci-
sion variable that indicates whether the corresponding bidder
(MNO n) is winner (xn,m = 1) or not (xn,m = 0) in the
corresponding SCm. Two objectives are considered:
1) Maximization of the third-party income. The third-
party allocates its available resources to the MNOs
that offer the highest bids, so as to compensate for
the SCs operation costs and its financial gain, G, is:
G =
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
xn,m · bn,m −M · CSC , (1)
where CSC is the SC cost, corresponding to the sum
of its CapEx and OpEx. For the calculation of the SCs
cost, the cost model presented in [11] is employed.
2) Minimization of the energy consumption. As the
macro BSs consume the major part of the network en-
ergy [11], the minimization of the consumed energy
is attained by reducing the number of active BSs. We
define the network energy consumption, E[E], as:
E[E] =
∑
n∈N
E[EBSn ] · (1− xn) +M · E[ESC ], (2)
xn =
∏
m∈M
xn,m, ∀n ∈ N , (3)
while E[EBSn ] and E[ESC ] represent the BS and SC
energy consumption, respectively. An operator is able
to switch off its BS, if it wins in all the auctions, a
condition that is represented by the product in Eq.
(3). The product is equal to 1 when the nth MNO
wins in all the M auctions, otherwise it is 0.
The two objectives are contradictive, since the maximiza-
tion of the third-party income does not imply the BSs switching
off, whereas the second objective does not ensure the third-
party’s interests. In order to capture this tradeoff, multiobjec-
tive optimization is employed [13]. The ILP multiobjective
optimization problem, namely P1, is formulated as follows:
P1: max
[
G, − E[E] ] (4)
s.t. ∑
n∈N
xn,m · CRn,m ≤ CRSC ,∀m ∈M, (5)
xn,m ∈ {0, 1},∀n ∈ N ,∀m ∈M. (6)
The objective function (4) aims at maximizing the financial
gain of the third-party and minimizing the network energy
consumption. Constraint in Eq. (5) ensures that the total
number of allocated resources does not exceed its availability
and constraint (6) ensures the integrality of the binary variable.
The multiobjective problem P1 has high complexity to
resolve. To overcome this problem, the second objective of
the problem, shown in Eq. (2) is transformed into a constraint
of a single-objective optimization problem [13]. The product in
Eq. (3) represents the condition of whether an operator wins
in all the auctions or not. Thus, the problem is transformed
into a simpler formulation in Eq. (7) and, at the same time,
the energy consumption objective is not neglected, in contrast
to former works [9], where only the maximization of the third-
party’s income is considered.
P2: max G =
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
xn,m · bn,m −M · CSC (7)
s.t. ∑
n∈N
∏
m∈M
xn,m ≥ 1, (8)∑
n∈N
xn,m · CRn,m ≤ CRSC ,∀m ∈M, (9)
xn,m ∈ {0, 1},∀n ∈ N ,∀m ∈M. (10)
The objective function (7) aims at maximizing the financial
gain of the third-party. Constraint (8) assures that an operator
3wins in all the M auctions (and switches off its BS) or loses
in all the auctions (keeps its BS active). Thus, this constraint
assures the minimization of the energy consumption given by
the Eq. (2), since the third-party achieves the maximization
of its income, by selecting the resource allocation that also
lead to the highest number of switched off BSs (assuring that
at least one operator switches off its BS). Constraints (9) and
(10) are the same as constraints (5) and (6), respectively.
D. Pricing Strategy
The VCG payment induces all the users to reveal their
actual valuations for the requested bandwidth. The third-party
charges the bidders (MNOs) with a price so as to compensate
for the requested capacity of the different bidders. For example,
an MNO who requires large bandwidth will have to pay a high
price, since its request results in dissatisfying other MNOs who
lose in the auction due to the limited capacity resources.
Let us denote by pn,m the price paid by the nth MNO to
the third-party for the allocated capacity of the mth SC. Thus,
Un,m =
{
un,m − pn,m, if MNO n is selected,
0, otherwise.
(11)
The payment rule for each MNO i ∈ N can be formally
defined as follows:
pi,m =
∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
x−in,m ·bn,m−
∑
n∈N\{i}
∑
m∈M
xn,m ·bn,m, (12)
where the first term of the equation is the aggregate valuation
of the allocated resources, x−in,m, when i MNO does not
participate in the auction. The second term is the aggregate
valuation of the allocation, xn,m, of MNOs other than i, when
i submits its requests and hence impacts the other MNOs.
Based on the VGC auction, it holds that bn,m = un,m,
thus assuring the truthfulness and individual rationality of the
payment rule.
IV. ANALYTICAL MODELS
In this section, we provide the analytical models for the
calculation of the network throughput and energy efficiency,
when the auction-based switching off algorithm is applied.
The traffic consists of data traffic with constant bit rate
R. We assume that, for each node k (BSn or SCm)1, data
sessions are Poisson processes with rate λ(k) and exponential
service time 1/µ(k). Hence, we model the operation of the
node k as a Markov chain. Each state of the system is
characterized by the number of active data sessions, denoted
by d. The maximum number of simultaneously served data
sessions is DBS = CRBS/R and DSC = CRSC/R for the
BSs and the SCs, respectively, given that CRBS and CRSC
refer to the BS and SC bandwidth, respectively. By defining
D = {DBS , DSC}, the balance equation is:
p
(k)
d =

(
λ(k)
µ(k)
)d
· 1
d!
· p(k)0 , d = 0, 1, ..., D,
0 , d ≥ D,
(13)
where p(k)0 represents the state probability that the node k
remains idle, calculated as:
p
(k)
0 =
(
D∑
d=0
(
λ(k)
µ(k)
)d
· 1
d!
)−1
. (14)
1We assume that k corresponds to a BSn or a SCm. Thus, k =
{BSn, SCm}.
A. Throughput
The expected throughput E [TBSn ], E [TSCm ], for the BSn
and SCm, respectively, is calculated as the average number
(over all possible states of the system) of served sessions in
the system multiplied by the transmission rate:
E [TBSn ] =
DBS∑
d=0
d ·R · p(BSn)d , and (15)
E [TSCm ] =
DSC∑
d=0
d ·R · p(SCm)d . (16)
where p(BSn)d , and p
(SCm)
d are the steady state probabilities for
the given traffic load rate λ(BSn), and λ(SCm), respectively.
In continuation, we calculate the throughput for the net-
work of N MNOs and the M SCs, after the application of
the algorithm. We define as λ
′(SCm) =
∑
i∈NOFF
λ(i), with
NOFF ⊆ N , the subset of operators that switch off their BSs,
the new average traffic load of the SCm, which is equal to the
traffic of the switched off BSs that must be served by SCm.
Thus, the total throughput of the network is:
E [T ] =
∑
n∈N
E [TBSn ] · (1− xn) +
∑
m∈M
E
[
T ′SCm
]
, (17)
where E
[
T ′SCm
]
is the average throughput of the mth SC when
it serves the traffic λ′(SCm).
B. Energy Efficiency
The expected energy efficiency E[η(BSn) ] of a BSn is
defined as the ratio of the average transmitted bits E [BBSn ]
over the average energy E [EBSn ]:
E[η(BSn) ] =
E [BBSn ]
E [EBSn ]
. (18)
The average transmitted bits during the night zone can be
calculated by multiplying the average throughput given in Eq.
(15) with the duration of the night zone tnight:
E [BBSn ] = E [TBSn ] · tnight. (19)
To calculate the average energy consumption, we should
take into account the power consumed by the BS for opera-
tion and transmission, consisting of three components: i) the
constant power Pcnst, consumed by an active BS for operations
such as cooling, antenna feeding, etc, ii) the idle power Pidle,
which is the power consumed when the BS remains idle, i.e.,
when there are no ongoing traffic sessions, iii) the transmission
power for serving the ongoing traffic sessions corresponding
to each state p(BSn)d , considering that Ptx denotes the trans-
mission power for serving a single data session. Hence, the
average energy consumption during the night zone tnight is:
E [EBSn ] =
Pcnst + Pidle · p(BSn)0 + DBS∑
d=0
Ptx · d · p(BSn)d
·tnight.
(20)
Accordingly, the expected energy efficiency E[η(SCm) ] for
the SCm is defined as:
E[η(SCm) ] =
E [BSCm ]
E [ESCm ]
,with (21)
4E [BSCm ] = E [TSCm ] · tnight, and (22)
E [ESCm ] = PSC · tnight, (23)
where the power of a SC, PSC , is slightly dependent on the
traffic [11], in contrast to the power of a BS that is significantly
dependent on the traffic load. Thus, a constant value for the
SC power is employed.
Finally, the total network energy efficiency is defined as:
E[η] =
E [B]
E [E]
,with (24)
E [B] =
∑
n∈N
E [BBSn ] · (1− xn) +
∑
m∈M
E
[
B′SCm
]
, and (25)
E [E] =
∑
n∈N
E [EBSn ] · (1− xn) +
∑
m∈M
E
[
E′SCm
]
, (26)
where E
[
B′SCm
]
and E
[
E′SCm
]
are the transmitted bits and
the energy consumption of the mth SC, when serving traffic
equal to λ′(SCm) =
∑
i∈NOFF
λ(i).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have developed a custom-made C simulator for the net-
work operation to validate the analytical expressions and assess
the performance of the proposed auction-based switching off
scheme. In this section, we present the simulation setup along
with the analytical and experimental results.
A. Simulation Scenario
The simulation scenario includes a cell served by N = 5
MNOs with as many BSs and M = 15 SCs that cover the
whole cell area. In our experiments, we assume that the MNOs
have different traffic volumes, i.e., ρn, and we examine two
scenarios, where MNOs with high and low traffic coexist.
Particularly, in Scenario 1, we consider that part of the MNOs,
denoted by Nlow, have relatively low traffic with ρn = 0.5,
while the remaining operators (i.e., N − Nlow) are fully
loaded with ρn = 1.0. In Scenario 2, we consider a more
heterogeneous setup in which one MNO has very high traffic
(ρn = 1.9), a number of MNOs, denoted by Nlow, have very
low traffic (ρn = 0.1), while the remaining operators (i.e.,
N −Nlow − 1) have traffic equal to ρn = 1.0.
To assess the performance of our scheme, we compare the
proposed energy efficient auction-based switching off strategy
(referred as ESO) to: i) an auction-based switching off scheme,
where the income of the third-party is the only objective to be
maximized (referred as ISO) [9], and ii) a baseline scenario,
where none of the BSs is switched off (referred as NSO). The
simulation parameters are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I. SIMULATION PARAMETERS [5], [10]
Parameter Value Parameter Value
# of SCs, M 15 Maximum BS transmission power 40 W
# of operators, N 5 Constant BS power, Pcnst 591 W
Data rate, R 256 kbps Total SC power, PSC 11 W
Before proceeding to the performance analysis results, let
us highlight that ESO and ISO schemes do not experience
any losses in terms of lost sessions. The idea behind the
resource allocation and the switching off decision is based on
the requirement that the whole traffic can be served, since
MNOs are motivated to apply an energy efficient algorithm, if
and only if the service of their users is guaranteed.
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Fig. 1. Performance results for Scenario 1: Varying number of MNOs with
ρn = 0.5, Nlow , and the rest N −Nlow MNOs with ρn = 1.0
B. Performance Results
Both the ESO and the ISO schemes maximize the income
gains of the third-party, since the outcome of the optimization
problems leads to the allocation of the whole capacity of the
SCs. In addition, by applying the ESO algorithm, we achieve
the energy consumption minimization, as well.
Firstly, we compare our proposal (ESO) to the state-of-
the-art approach (ISO) for the Scenario 1 in terms of the
number of switched off BSs (Fig. 1(a)) and network energy
efficiency (Fig. 1(b)). In Fig. 1(a), we observe that, with our
proposal, more BSs are switched off in the majority of the
cases. The higher number of deactivated BSs is explained
by the second objective that we employ in our algorithm,
concerning the minimization of the energy consumption. In
ISO, the BSs to be switched off are selected to increase the
income of the third-party, without considering the network
energy efficiency. Furthermore, in order to gain more insight
on the network performance, we have plotted in Fig. 1(b)
the average total energy efficiency of the network for the
same scenario, comparing our approach to the ISO and NSO
algorithms. Our proposal always outperforms the NSO and the
ISO and the energy efficiency gains are remarkable reaching
up to 337%. Compared to the ISO, our proposal achieves better
performance, due to the higher number of switched off BSs.
The performance results for the Scenario 2 are given in
terms of the number of switched off BSs (Fig. 2(a)) and net-
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Fig. 2. Performance results for Scenario 2: Varying number of MNOs with
ρn = 0.1, Nlow , 1 MNO with ρn = 1.9 and the rest N −Nlow − 1 MNOs
with ρn = 1.0
work energy efficiency (Fig. 2(b)). In Fig. 2(a), ESO achieves
again a higher number of switched off BSs compared to ISO.
In contrast to Fig. 1(b), we observe that the difference in the
number of switched off BSs between ESO and ISO is even
higher because of the higher difference between the traffic load
of the MNOs. The ISO scheme gives priority to the MNO
with the highest traffic to increase the third-party’s income,
whereas our approach leads to higher number of switched off
BSs, while at the same time achieving significant gains in
the third-party’s income (all the available SCs resources are
leased). Consequently, the energy efficiency gains are even
more significant in the Scenario 2, as shown in Fig. 2(b).
In Fig. 3, we validate via simulations the analytical models
for the throughput and the energy efficiency. The experimental
results perfectly match the analysis, thus validating the pro-
posed theoretical expressions. The throughput increases with
the traffic load (case: Nlow = 1 with higher traffic compared
to the case: Nlow = 5), which is a rational conclusion, while,
as expected, the network energy efficiency is higher when the
network traffic is lower (case: Nlow = 5 with lower traffic),
since fewer users implies higher number of switched off BSs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by the low BSs utilization during
the night and the coexistence of multiple operators and third-
party SCs in the same area, we proposed a novel auction-
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Fig. 3. Throughput and energy efficiency validation
based switching off algorithm that achieves energy savings
by encouraging MNOs to share the SCs resources and switch
off redundant BSs. The proposed scheme has been evaluated
in terms of throughput and energy efficiency and the results
have shown that our proposal can significantly improve the
energy efficiency, comparing to the state-of-the-art approaches,
guaranteeing at the same time the throughput in realistic
scenarios, motivating the MNOs to adopt our auction-based
strategy for their decisions. In our future work, we plan to
elaborate on cooperative schemes to investigate the trade offs.
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